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Abstract
The restrictive regulation imposed on immigrant workers on the Swiss
labor market has been the subject of various recent studies [5] [18][7]. This
interest is among else due to the upcoming change in regulation implied
in the bilateral treaties. These treaties will signiﬁcantly liberalize the
access of immigrant workers to the Swiss labor market. The present paper
models wages in a labor market segregated by skill levels and estimates
discrimination in view of the possible impacts of this regulatory change
on a micro level in a typical trans-border labor market, i.e. the Canton
Ticino.
1I n t r o d u c t i o n
Since 1st June 2002 the bilateral treaty on free mobility between the European
Union and Switzerland is eﬀective. Speculations abound (especially in border
regions) on the impact this might have on wages and other labor market indica-
tors. Given that the ”deregulation” concerns changes in the regulation via work
permits of immigrant workers, the ”natural” instrument to investigate potential
impacts seems to be the wage function. This permits to identify discrimina-
tory shifts in wages due to the speciﬁc status of immigrant workers and thus to
speculate on the impacts of a free mobility.
Wage functions for Switzerland usually show a signiﬁcant negative shift for
the various categories of work permits for foreign labor force with respect to
Swiss residents [5][7]. This is then interpreted as institutional (regulatory) dis-
crimination of foreigners. As a consequence, liberalization (bilateral treaties)
can be expected to have an equalizing eﬀect on wages (i.e. a negative one on
∗Paper presented at the 42nd Congress of the European Regional Science Association,
Dortmund 2002. An earlier version has been presented at the 2002 Congress of the Swiss
Society of Economics and Statistics, Neuchâtel.
†We would like to thank Patrick Gagliardini, Lugano, for his help.
1the salaries of Swiss residents). This paper re-proposes the argument from a
slightly diﬀerent perspective. First, attention is shifted from a labor supply
interpretation of the wage function in a human capital perspective to a more
general argument of hedonic markets and equalizing diﬀerences [16]. Second,
the focus is on the demand side in so far as the attribution of jobs to skill
segments by ﬁrms is modeled.
The central idea is that the role of permits in wage discrimination has to be
disentangled from the argument of labor market segmentation into Swiss and
foreign work force. The hypothesis is that wages are not formed (matches are not
found) and human capital investments are not evaluated on separate markets for
Swiss and for foreign labor force, but that the restrictive regulation for distinct
categories of foreign labor force creates a strongly diﬀerentiated discrimination
based on a process of segmentation by skills. This paper therefore documents
the attempt to model the wage formation on the Ticino labor market on the base
of a selection process according to three levels of skills and discusses the issue
of discrimination and impacts of deregulation on the bases of the estimation
results.
In the following, we present the theoretical framework and the empirical
model, describe the data used and the sample characteristics. We then present
and discuss the empirical ﬁndings and draw conclusions on discrimination and
the impact of deregulation.
2 Theoretical framework
Wage functions are regressions of market prices on characteristics of the individ-
uals employed, and as such represent typical hedonic functions. As introduced
by Rosen 1974 [15], such functions can be interpreted as reﬂecting the outcome
of an implicit market for these characteristics. In this framework, the hedonic
function represents ”... a joint envelope of a family of value functions and an-
other family of oﬀer functions.” (Rosen 1974 p.44). In a labor market context,
the oﬀer functions can be interpreted as workers’ indiﬀerence curves between
wage and attribute levels, while the value functions represent the ﬁrms’ isoproﬁt
curves with respect to labor cost and characteristics [4].
The following simple model of compensating wage diﬀerentials can serve
as a rationale for our hedonic (switching) regression of wage functions in skill
segments.
The regional labor market matches job oﬀers by which ﬁrms demand labor
services with speciﬁc skills and job requests by which individuals oﬀer labor
services with speciﬁc skills. The matches result in observable market wages and
a vector describing the skills. A hedonic wage function (eq. 1) relates wages
(w) and skills (S):
w = w(S) (1)
2The vector of ﬁrst derivatives of this function, wS returns the implicit (hedo-
nic) prices of the characteristics. The underlying hypotheses about behaviour of
ﬁrms and individuals are as follows. A ﬁrm produces with only labor input1 in
a competitive market, taking the price (p) and is assumed to maximize a proﬁt
function deﬁned on the vector of skills (S) of the general form given in eq. 2,
Π = pf(S) − wSS (2)
f(.) is a production function with the usual properties (fS > 0;fSS < 0),
and where ﬁxed cost is absent. The vector S employed in production is acquired
on the market renting a vector L of heterogeneous labor at diﬀerentiated wages.
In analogy to Lancaster’s (1966) linear consumption technology the vectors L
and S can be thought of as being related via a matrix B describing the skills
by individual2 as in eq. 3.
S = BL (3)
To maximize proﬁt, ﬁrms will employ single skills up to where marginal
revenue (value of the marginal product) equals marginal cost (eq. 4).
w(bid)S = pfS = wS (4)
If individual workers are located in a speciﬁc segment of the S space, i.e. can
vary their skill within certain limits around their actual positions (see below),
then the above ﬁrm behavior will deﬁne a family of isoproﬁt curves indicating
the bids a ﬁrm will make for skills in a speciﬁcs e g m e n t .T h e s ei s o p r o ﬁtc u r v e s
(eq. 5) will have the usual properties (concavity and increasing proﬁts towards
South-East).
w(bid)=w(S;Π,f) (5)
The model of ﬁrm behavior implies in general terms that ﬁrms under perfect
competition and given the production technology f are forced to pay a positive
wage diﬀerential for higher skills and are willing to do so as long as proﬁti s
≥ 0. Or in other words, in order to accept lower skills - depreciation of the
workforce due to non investment in human capital - ﬁrms will lower wages for
the individuals concerned to maintain zero proﬁts. The maximum price she
must pay for it on the market. Hence, the equilibrium is where w = w(bid) and
wS = w(bid)S (tangency condition).
1Adding other production factors does not change the arguments made here.
2Note that this linearity assumption permits repackaging on a ﬁrm level (e.g. one worker
with 6 years of schooling and 1 with 12 years of schooling are the same as 2 workers with 9
years of schooling. However, the ﬁrm still has to buy packages of S tied in single individuals).
3Turning to the households, behavior can be modeled in analogy. According
to the human capital literature [2][17], individuals are only willing to invest in
human capital i.e. improve their skills, if they can hope for a reward in form of
a positive wage diﬀerential. This is due to the fact that investments in human
capital are costly (forgone wages or leisure). This view of skills as a ”bad” that
is necessary for satisfying the strong desire to substantially increase income,
seems to be, as Piore 1973 [14] notes, quite accurate if one relies on the common
judgements by workers and managers.
From a human capital perspective, beneﬁts of increased skills consist in
a positive wage diﬀerential to compensate the costs of the investment in the
form of foregone earnings [6]. Translated into our context, utility maximizing
individuals will oﬀer S so that at the margin the wage diﬀerential wS exactly
compensates the foregone earnings (eq. 6).
wS = w(offer)S (6)
Individuals are located at a certain position on the skills axes and can de-
cide whether to invest in human capital (increase skills), disinvest (loose skills
through depreciation) or maintain the present level of skills. From this marginal-
ist perspective on human capital, individuals will seek matches on the labor
market in the neighborhood of their actual position. Therefore it is possible
to describe individual oﬀer behavior on the labor market with respect to their
skills by a family of indiﬀerence curves, indicating the acceptable bids for given
utility levels (U)a n dt a s t e s( t) (see eq. 7).
w(offer)=w(S;U,t) (7)
The indiﬀerence curves are convex and utility is increasing towards North-
West. The minimum wage an individual is willing to accept at the given skill
level is the sum the market will pay for it. Hence, the equilibrium is where
w = w(offer) and wS = w(offer)S (tangency condition). In general terms,
individuals will be interested to improve their skill only, if the market is oﬀering
a positive wge diﬀerential, or, in other terms, they are willing to maintain their
skills, if depreciation is penalized with a negative wage diﬀerential.
At market clearing implicit prices, bids and oﬀers will match and the hedonic
function will delineate this market outcomes3. In market equilibrium w(bid)=
w = w(offer) and w(bid)S = wS = w(offer)S. Figure 1 illustrates the hedonic
function and elements of the family of bid and oﬀer functions.
3For a discussion of market clearing conditions see the original paper by Rosen 1974.




w(bid2) = w(S; , f)
w(bid3) = w(S; , f)
w(bid1) = w(S; , f)
w(offer2) = w(S; U, t)
3 The empirical model
In this paper the relevance of the immigrant worker status for wage discrimina-
tion is measured via market wages for diﬀerents skills. Therefore the empirical
program does not foresee second stage estimation of the bid and oﬀer functions4.
Instead, the focus is on the estimation of the wage function. The theoretical
argument made so far has left out any consideration on labor market status
of individuals on purpose. According to the above, immigrant workers with a
speciﬁc permit will take diﬀerent salaries from resident workers only in so far
as they have signiﬁcantly diﬀerent skills, i.e. are oﬀering in diﬀerent segments.
In other words; if skill driven wage diﬀerentials can be isolated, remaining wage
diﬀerentials will have to be explained on an ad-hoc basis, but not by segmen-
tation according to labor market status. In this sense, work permits are simply
an individual characteristic5.
4The available data contain very little production relevant information to estimate the bid
functions. The estimation of the individual oﬀers function would seem to be more promising.
The second step issues will be discussed in a forcoming paper.
5This is of course not satisfactory because regulation in form of contingents, preferential
treatments and the like have an immediate impact on supply shortages, elasticities and hence
on wage diﬀerentials. But as the implementation of the regulation is in the hands of the
(cantonal) political authorities this behaviour would have to be endogenized using public
choice instruments. This, however, would go beyond the scope of this paper.
5The formulation of the empirical model contains only one challenge: the level
of skills is multidimensional and not directly observable. What is observable
on the labor market are education, experience, tenure, professions, industries,
hierarchical levels etc. All these variables are usually included together with
further individual characteristics in the wage function - and this paper makes
no exception. In our hedonic interpretation, the market will therefore reveal
implicit prices for these multiple characteristics and not for skills measured along
one dimension. From a ﬁrm’s perspective the characteristics of the individuals
(e.g. education) are signals for the underlying level of skills oﬀered; and from
an individual’s perspective, the characteristics required (e.g. hierarchical level)
are signals as well, but for the level of skills that are required.
The level of skills required by ﬁrms becomes the driver of market segmen-
tation in our empirical model. Firms deﬁne the level of skills required by the
production context for a speciﬁc job either explicitely6.They are willing to pay
higher wages for higher skills not observables by them. This will normally induce
them to identify speciﬁc market segments through a speciﬁc search mechanism
(e.g. job hunter or advertisements in top business newspapers for high skills as
compared to an advertisement in a local newspaper). This will translate on the
labor market into higher bids for the same level of a characteristic (e.g. years
of schooling) in the high skill segment.
Given this constellation it seems useful to rely upon a switching regression
model for the empirical analysis of the implicit prices of characteristics in a
labor market segmented by skill levels. The switch function will capture the
inﬂuence of production technology and process indicators on the attribution of
jobs to required skills levels and hence to segments. Hedonic wage functions for
each segments will then be use to estimate the implicit price of characteristics
in the diﬀerent segments.
As skill is an ordered phenomenon an ordered probit procedure is applied to
estimated the attribution of jobs to skills level (regimes). The ordered probit
equation that determines the ﬁrm’s probability to express a labor demand for
skill level i is:
SD∗
i = ω0Zi + εi (8)
SD∗
i describes the skill demanded by ﬁrms on the labor market, Zi is a
vector of characteristics describing the production context, ω0 is the associated
coeﬃcient vector to be estimated and εi is a normally distributed error with
mean µε and variance σ2
ε.
SD∗
i is not directly observable, so what we do observe is SDi, a multinomial
ordered choice variable taking the value of 1 for low skill (LS), 2 for medium
skill (MS)a n d3 for high skill (HS).
6Our data contain a skills variable where for example highest skills required are deﬁned as







2 if γ1 <S D ∗
i ≤ γ2
3 if γ2 <S D ∗
i
(9)
γ1,γ2 are limits points to be estimated by the ordered probit model.
Therefore we have the following probabilities:
Pr(SDi =1 ) =Pr(SD∗
i ≤ γ1)= Φ(α1)
Pr(SDi =2 ) =Pr(γ1 <S D ∗
i ≤ γ2)= Φ(α2) − Φ(α1)
Pr(SDi =3 ) =Pr(γ2 <S D ∗
i)= 1 − Φ(α2)
(10)





As said before our focus is on the estimation of the wage functions. Taking
the natural logarithm of wage the function become:
lnWSi = β0SXi + υSi (11)
WSi is the wage observed for each individual i working in the skill segment S,
Xi is a vector of individual socio-economic characteristics and of job descriptors
in the tradition of Mincer 1974 [13] of the observation i, β0S is the associated
coeﬃcient vector and υSi is a normally distributed error relative to the skill
segment S and individual i with mean and variance µυS and σ2
υS.
Therefore three wage function have to be estimated, one for each segment





lnWLSi = β0LSXi + υLSi if SDi =1
lnWMSi = β0MSXi + υMSi if SDi =2
lnWHSi = β0HSXi + υHSi if SDi =3
(12)
If the wage determination would be independent of the selection procces,
i.e. εi would be independent from υSi, the regression function for each skill
segment would take the same formulation as the whole sample. But in general,
according to Heckman [11] [8] the conditional expectation of υSi on εi diﬀers
from zero, therefore wages and selection procces results respectively non inde-
pendent. Therefore, least squares regression on wage in a speciﬁc skill segment
using only data observed in the subsample produces inconsistent estimates of β.
Assuming εi and υSi being both normally distributed, they have a bivariate
normal distribution with means ,µε, µυS,v a r i a n c eσ2
ε, σ2
υS, and correlation ρευS.
Therfore, following the moments of the incidentally truncated bivariate normal
distribution [8] as explained in appendix A, we have, for the ﬁrst segment:
7E(lnWi | SDi =1 ) =E(lnWLSi | SD∗
i ≤ γ1)
= β0LSXi + E(υLSi | εi ≤ γ1 − ω0Zi)
= β0LSXi + ψLSλLSi(α1)+ηLSi
(13)
where ψLS = ρευLSσυLS,λLSi =
−φ(α1)
Φ(α1) is the inverse Mill’s ratio that cor-
rects the selection bias. For the second segment the expectation is:
E(lnWi | SDi =2 ) =E(lnWMSi | γ1 <S D ∗
i ≤ γ2)
= β0MSXi + E(υMSi | γ1 < ω0Zi + εi ≤ γ2)
= β0MSXi + ψMSλMSi(α1;α2)+ηMSi
(14)
where ψMS = ρευMSσυMS,λMSi =
φ(α2)−φ(α1)
Φ(α2)−Φ(α1) is the inverse Mill’s ratio.
Finally for the third segment:
E(lnWi | SDi =3 ) =E(lnWHSi | γ2 <S D ∗
i)
= β0HSXi + E(υHSi | εi > γ2 − ω0Zi)
= β0HSXi + ψHSλHSi(α2)+ηHSi
(15)
where ψHS = ρευHSσυHS,λHSi =
φ(α2)
1−Φ(α2) is again the inverse Mill’s ratio.
As shown in the equations 13 14 and 15 we correct the selection bias in
the conditional expected mean of lnWi adding λSi to the speciﬁcation of the
model. The inverse Mill’s ratio is, as explained in Heckman 1979 [11], ”... a
monotone decreasing function of the probability that an observation is selected
in the sample”. In other words, increasing the probability of an observation to
belong to the selected skill segment, the inverse Mill’s ratio decreases, implying
a lesser corrective eﬀect on the mean of the subsample.
4 Estimation and results
The data at disposal for the estimation of our model consist of 48’472 individual
observations of occupied jobs in Ticino in 2000. The information stems from the
Federal Statistics on the Structure of Salaries (LSE) survey among a represen-
tative sample of 5’675 ﬁrms reporting salaries, job characteristics and individual
attributes. Descriptive statistics of the variables included in our model can be
found in the appendix C.
In the ﬁrst step ordered probit model the choice variable has three levels ac-
cording to the three skill segments. The probability of an observation to belong
to one of the three levels depends on the industry, the size of the ﬁrm, the hier-
archical level of the job and the degree of occupation. The type of industry and
t h es i z eo ft h eﬁrm serve as indicators for the production technology. The hier-
archical level and the degree of occupation describe the job in the organisational
context.
8Table 1 presents the estimation results. Given that our interest in this ﬁrst
step lies mainly in the estimation of the limits between the segments and the
estimation of the inverse Mill’s ratio to be included in the wage estimation we
limit our comments to the interpretation of the signs7.
Table 1: Ordered probit etiamtes of the skill levels




Hotels and restaurants -0.6268 0.0223
Finance and insurance 0.0419 0.0290
Informatics and R&D 0.1417 0.0233
Educational sector 0.7093 0.0591
Firm size -0.0002 0.0000
Work time 0.6361 0.0303
Top management 3.8001 0.0364
Middle management 2.2379 0.0361
Lower management 1.5559 0.0261
Employees with limited responsability 1.0620 0.0201
Limit 2 0.6032 0.0295
Limit 3 4.0227 0.0416
N. Observations 48222
Log likelihood -28559.85
Note: Dependent variable is the level of skill required by ﬁrms.
The ﬁrst thing worth noting is that hotels and restaurants, and to a lesser
extent manufacturing, have a high probability to ﬁnd their human resources in
the lowest skill segment, while the ﬁnance and insurance sector seems to target
the three segments alike. The educational sector, as well as informatics, reseach
and developement and construction places search preferably in the high skill
sector. While this conﬁrms expectations for the ﬁrst to, it is rather surprising for
construction. The ﬁrm size has a signiﬁcant but small impact on the probability
to bid for jobs in high skill segments. This implies that the smallest ﬁrms -
in Ticino, traditionally the consulting ﬁrms, lawyers and the like, express the
highest demand for high skills. The fact that the probability to end up in the
highest skill segment increases with the hierarchical level conﬁrms intuition.
Firms oﬀering jobs to part time workers have a signiﬁcat bias towards low skill
jobs. Rather than commenting these results, we will refer to some of the ﬁndings
in the context with the wage equations.
7For interpretation, the coeﬃcients from an ordered probit model would have to be trans-
formed in to marginal eﬀects. This is of limited interest in our case given that the independent
variables are dummies variables. The signs of the coeﬃcients can in any case be interpreted
in a straightforward way: a negative sign indicates an increasing probability of belonging to
segment 1, and a decreasing probability of belonging to segment 3, etc..
9Three log-linear hedonic regressions have been performed for the respective
segments8. The dependent variable is the natural logarithm of the monthly
wage, the explanatory variables can be seen from table 2. They measure the
impact of human capital indicators (schooling, experience, tenure), martial sta-
tus and gender, job descriptor (degree of occupation) and, ﬁnally the type of
permit for the immigrant workers (the reference category being the Swiss labor
force). Table 2 presents the estimation results for the three segments.
Table 2: Estimates of the wage function for three skill segments
Low Skill Medium Skill High Skill
Variable Coeﬀ.S t d . E .C o e ﬀ.S t d . E .C o e ﬀ.S t d . E .
Constant 7.7331 0.0178 7.8969 0.0206 8.3636 0.1156
Schooling 0.0311 0.0014 0.0501 0.0012 0.0553 0.0052
Experience 0.0110 0.0006 0.0230 0.0007 0.0210 0.0047
Exp.2/100 -0.0183 0.0012 -0.0406 0.0014 -0.0154 0.0083
Tenure 0.0095 0.0007 0.0043 0.0006 0.0049 0.0031
Tenure2/100 -0.0126 0.0027 -0.0023 0.0020 -0.0205 0.0079
Femal -0.1727 0.0042 -0.1478 0.0041 -0.1316 0.0296
Married 0.0097 0.0043 0.0154 0.0041 0.0968 0.0249
Occup. degree -0.1783 0.0062 -0.2279 0.0066 -0.5188 0.0401
Unionized -0.0347 0.0059 -0.0928 0.0062 -0.1536 0.0448
Firm size -0.00004 0.0000 0.0002 0.0000 0.0011 0.0000
Seasonal -0.0834 0.0156 -0.0737 0.0211 0.0719 0.2186
Annual -0.0258 0.0081 0.0387 0.0098 0.4151 0.0497
Resident -0.0315 0.0047 -0.0384 0.0051 0.0291 0.0309
Cross border -0.0559 0.0054 -0.0766 0.0052 -0.1268 0.0424
Other permits -0.0617 0.0195 0.0130 0.0188 -0.0329 0.0597
Inv. Mill’s ratio -0.1621 0.0047 0.2542 0.0050 -0.0932 0.0111
Adj. weigh. R2 0.9956 0.9908 0.9563
Observations 17120 25604 2723
Note: Dependent variable natural logarithm of wage
In accordance with our expectations, the coeﬃcients of the selected variables
are signiﬁcant, conforming a selection process with respect to the skill levels.
The signs of the human capital indicators are also according to expectations.
The wage diﬀerential9 for an additional schooling year is 3.1% for low skills
(mean of ”schooling” = 10.5 years) and 5.5% in the high skill segment (mean
of ”schooling” = 14.5 years). Segmentation by skills seems to result in slightly
lower ﬁgures than those reported (for earlier years) from wage functions on the
whole sample (see [5]). Experience shows signiﬁcant diﬀerence among segments.
An additional year in the same profession in the low skill segment returns a
8For a systematic discussion of the functional form in hedonic regressions see Cadlini 2001
[1].
9For the correct computation of the marginal eﬀects of regressors on wage see appendix B.
100.28% increase of wage at the average experience of 22 years, and a similar
0.61% increase in the medium skill segment at an average experience of 21 years.
In contrast, the marginal wage increase in the high skill segment amounts to
2% at an average of 26 years. Experience seems to pay above all in the high
skill segment. The impacts of an additional year are very similar for tenure,
i.e. 0.77% and 0.43% for the low and medium skill segments, respectively, but
diﬀer for the high skill segment, where no signiﬁcant impact is found. Given
the high average tenure in this segment, this provides a ﬁrst evidence for a
labor market with low job turnover, and hence with a positive diﬀerential for
newcomers. A second evidence in the same direction is provided by the dummy
for workers with annual permits. This variable returns a negative sign in the
low skil segment, but a positve one in the other two segments. First, it is
instructive that segmentation by skills helps to contradict the common result
that wage discrimination against foreigners prevails, independently from the
type of permit. We ﬁnd this result in the case of annual permits only for
the low skill segment. Second, the drastic positive wage diﬀerential (about
50%) in the high skill segment indicates that scarce top position are selectively
being occupied by mobile immigrant workforce10. Further results on immigrant
workers show that foreign residents take more or less the same salary as Swiss
whereas trans-border commuters are discriminated to an increasing extent with
rising skill levels. In their case, the Swiss regulation clearly works in favor of
the resident work force, exploiting a very elastic labor supply from neighboring
Lombardy provinces with lower cost of living.
Important variation among skill levels is to be observed with respect to ﬁrm
size. In the ﬁrst skill segment size is negatively correlated with the wage level,
in the medium skill segment it is slightly larger than zero while in the high skill
segment, the marginal eﬀect is clearly positive11. Similarly, we ﬁnd that the
degree of occupation has a positive impact in the low skill segment, is more
or less neutral for medium skills and negative for high skills. Even considering
a premium for part time work, this means that part time can be ”paying” in
the high skill segment only. Finally it is worth noting that wage discrimination
by gender is almost constant across skill levels but amounts to only a bit more
than half of the importance found without segmentation [7]. This has to be
interpreted together with the fact that women have higher probability to take
jobs in the low skill segment.
The coeﬃcients of the inverse Mill’s ratio are signiﬁcant in all three equa-
tions, indicating a relevant selection bias stemming from ﬁrm’s identiﬁcation of
skill segments. The negative sign in the low skill segment indicates that the
selection proces aﬀects wages negatively and that the lower the probability of a
job to belong to this segment, the more the wage should be corrected upwards
(the inverse Mill’s ratio is negative with truncation from above). In analogy,
10Note that discrimination against Swiss labor force implies a shortage also on the labor
market at the immigrants’ origin. In this case the contingent regulation plays a bad trick
to the residnets ﬁlling up the jobs ﬁrst, when thereafter the ﬁrms have to pay premiums to
attract internationally mobile labor force to the local market.
11For the calculation of marginal eﬀects see appendix B.
11the negative sign in the high skill segment demonstrates a negative impact of
the selection process on wages, indicating that the lower the probability of a job
to belong to this segment, the more the wage should be corrected downwards.
In other words, observations are allocated correctly to the low and high skill
segments. The positive sign in the medium skill segment illustrate a dominance
of the ”high skill bias”, i.e. the selection process biases wages upwards. Hence,
the lower the probability of a job to be rightly allocated to this intermediate
segment, the more the wage should be corrected upwards. Putting this in diﬀer-
ent terms it can be said that not considering the selection process, wages would
be underestimated in the low and medium skill sectors, and overestimated in
the high skill sector.
5C o n c l u s i o n s
The main aim of this paper was to disentangle segmentation by skills from
wage discrimination against immigrant workers in the case of the Ticino labor
market. The leading hypothesis was that in the proposed analytical perspective
of implicit markets for skills, wage diﬀerentials with respect to work permits
would have to reﬂect the very diﬀerentiated implementation of regualtion. This
expectation is by and large conﬁrmed by the empirical ﬁndings. The most
stiking result is a positive wage diﬀerential in the segment for highly skilled labor
in favor of holders of a yearly permit that contrasts with a negative diﬀenetial for
trans-border commuters in this, as well as in the lower skill segments. Finally,
foreign residents do not seem to suﬀer from wage discrimination as compared to
residents of Swiss nationality. The very tight contingents on yearly permits seem
to play againts the Swiss top managers with a rather high tenure and in favor
of internationally sourced but expensive managers and specialists. On the other
hand, the restrictions on access an job mobility for trans border commuters
allow for a signiﬁcant discrimination of this highly elastic labor supply.
Speculating about the impact of the liberalization brought about by the bi-
lateral treaty on free mobility our results imply the following: in the market
segmentation for top skills, the opening of the market will increase competition
among foreigners for the highly paid jobs on the Ticino (Swiss?) labor mar-
ket. Hence, salaries might fall improving the competitiveness of Swiss industry.
Whether a lower discrimination will be considered positive for the residents is
left to interpretation. In the quantitatively more important segment of medium
skills, the liberalization will tend to have the opposite impact, creating a pres-
sure on the positive diﬀerential for the Swiss workforce. Finally, the trans-border
commuters, already occupying up to 70% of the jobs in some Ticino industries
will above all enjoy the increased job mobility in Switzerland and hence create
an upward pressure on salaries via inter-industry migration on the Ticino labor
market. For the rest, given the highly elastic and the important share in the low
skill labor market, the liberalization will not have a relevant impact on salaries
of Swiss residents. It should ﬁnally be noted that these speculations do not take
into account the eventually reduced demand for lavor in some industries (e.g.
12building realted branches) due to direct competition from Italian ﬁrms.
13A I n c i d e n t a lt r u n c a t i o ni nab i v a r i a t en o r m a l
distribution:
Following the theory of incidental truncation in a bivariate distribution we solve
the equations n. 13 14 and 15. Suppose that y and z have a bivariate normal
distribution with means µy,µ z variance σ2
y,σ2
z and correlation ρ, then:






if z<a , then we have to make a replacement: λ(αz)=
−φ(αz)
Φ(αz)
if a1 <z≤ a2, then we have to make a replacement:λ(αz)=
φ(α2)−φ(α1)
Φ(α2)−Φ(α1)
14BT h e m a r g i n a l e ﬀect of the regressors on the
wage functions
The marginal eﬀect of the regressors X on the wage (Wi) is βS only if the
regressor is a continous variable who doesn’t apper in the selection function:
E(lnWi | SDi)=β0SXi + ψSλSi(αSi)+ηSi (17)









In case that a regressor xk appears in the ordered probit equation SDi =
1,2,3, the marginal eﬀect of xk on lnWi consists of two components [8]. The
ﬁrst is the direct eﬀect on the mean of lnWi,w i c hi sβS as conventionally; the
second is the eﬀect of the presence of λSi in the corrected equation.
Therefore the full eﬀect of changes in a regressor xk that appears in both Xi
and Zi in the low skill segment is:
δE [lnWLS | SDi =1 ]
δxk







In the case of the medium skill segment the full marginal eﬀect is represented
by:
δE [lnWMS | SDi =2 ]
δxk












For the third segment (high skill) we have:
δE [lnWHS | SDi =3 ]
δxk







For dummy variables (Di) appearing in the wage function only (where j =1
if D =1and 0 otherwise):
E(lnWji | SDi)=β0SXi + ζ0SDi + ψSλSi(αS)+ηSi (24)
then the marginal eﬀect on the wage can be explained [9] in the following
way:
E(W1i | SDi)=eβ0SXi+ψSλSi(αS)+ηieζS (25)
E(W0i | SDi)=eβ0SXi+ψSλSi(αS)+ηSi (26)
E [W1iSDi] − E [W0iSDi]
E [W0iSDi]
= eζS − 1 (27)
For the speciﬁc case of the regressors ”experience” and ”tenure” (represented
by Ai), the variables appear in the wage functions in a quadratic formulation
to capture the decreasing rate of return.














16CV a r i a b l e s p e c i ﬁcation
Variable Description
Skill Skill level required by employer.
Ln Wage Natural logarithm of 2000 October’s monthly stan-
dardised wage.
Industry:
Manufacturing Employed in the manufacturing branch (see
NOGA2 15-37).
Construction Employed in the construction branch (see NOGA2
45).
Retailing Employed in the retail trade branch (see NOGA2
52).
Hotels and restaurants Employed in the hotels and restaurants service
branch (see NOGA2 55).
Finance and insurance Employed in the ﬁnance or insurance service
branch (see NOGA2 70-73).
Informatics and R&D Employed in the informatics or reserach and devel-
opement service branch (see NOGA2 70-74).
Educational sector Employed in the educational sector (see NOGA2
80).
Firm size Size of ﬁrm, number of empoyees in the ﬁrm at 31
October 2000.
Hierarchical level:
Top manager Dummy variable: 1 = top management; 0 = oth-
erwise.
Middle manager Dummy variable: 1 = middle management; 0 =
otherwise.
Lower manager Dummy variable: 1 = lower management; 0 = oth-
erwise.
Employees Dummy variable: 1 = employee with limited re-
sponsability; 0 = otherwise.
Gender Dummy variable: 1 = femal; 0 = man.
Occup. degree Individual percentage of occupation in the ﬁrm.
Schooling Years of schooling.
Experience Years of experience in the labor market.
Tenure Years spent in the current employment.
Martial status Dummy variable: 1 = married; 0 = otherwise.
Union Dummy variable: 1 = unionized worker; 0 = oth-
erwise.
17Continuation of variable speciﬁcation’s table
Permits:
Seasonal Dummy variable: 1 = seasonal (A) work permit; 0
=o t h e r w i s e .
Annual Dummy variable: 1 = annual (B) work permit; 0
=o t h e r w i s e .
Resident Dummy variable: 1 = resident (C) work permit; 0
=o t h e r w i s e .
Cross border Dummy variable: 1 = cross border (G) work per-
mit; 0 = otherwise.
Other permits Dummy variable: 1 = other permits (<1y e a r )










Wage* 5’035.20 3’629.40 5’304.15 11’463.60
Schooling* 11.73 10.48 12.29 14.47
Experience* 21.74 22.47 20.80 26.60
Tenure* 8.15 6.88 8.53 12.16
Firm size* 122 134 121 63
Occup. degree* 0.91 0.88 0.93 0.96
Married 28’388 10’948 15’345 2’095
Female 18’632 8’996 9’273 363
Swiss 23’278 5’847 15’404 2’027
Seasonal 683 439 234 10
Annual 2’517 1’403 975 139
Resident 10’357 4’975 4’997 385
Cross border 10’838 5’185 5’470 183
Other permits 498 190 249 59
Unionized 6’402 2’982 3’246 174
Top management 3’518 - 1’248 2’270
Middle management 3’268 - 2’944 324
Lower management 4’854 264 4’514 76
Employees 6’107 951 5’126 30
Other labor 29’159 16’158 12’904 97
Manufacturing 9’999 4’218 5’284 497
Construction 6’598 2’168 4’150 280
Retailing 5’108 2238 2’658 212
Hotels and restaurants 5’439 3’348 1’994 97
Finance and insurance 3’617 755 2’588 274
Informatic, immobile and
R&D
3’617 755 2’588 274
Instruction 541 109 399 33
Observations 48’222 18’066 27’351 2’805
Note: The table reported the number of observation each variable.*Average.
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